Pollution decay, consumer awareness and optimal carbon taxes by Sandal, Leif Kristoffer & Steinshamn, Stein Ivar
Pollution Decay, Consumer Awareness and
Optimal Carbon Taxes
LEIF K. SANDAL and STEIN I. STEINSHAMN
Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration
Helleveien 30
N-5045 Bergen
NORWAY
Phone: + 47 55 959 258
Fax: + 47 55 959 439
E-mail: stein.steinshamn@snf.no
February 2004
1
Abstract
The e¤ects of non-linear decay and consumer preferences are analyzed in a
setting where optimal extraction of non-renewable resources is combined with
stock externalities. The control is exercised via a corrective tax and the time
horizon is divided into two periods: an initial phase with extraction and a
terminal phase without extraction. The time horizon with extraction is deter-
mined endogenously. The model does not assume separability of the objective
function. Sensitivity results indicate large di¤erences in the optimal extraction
period, the total level of extraction and cumulative emissions depending on the
form of the decay function and the presence of consumers’ awareness for the
environment.
Keywords: Global warming, fossil fuel extraction, dynamic optimisation
JEL: C61, Q25, Q28, Q30
2
INTRODUCTION
Given the potential e¤ects of climate change, a great deal of attention has been
focused on the derivation of optimal carbon taxes (Nordhaus 1982, 1991a, 1991b,
Peck and Teisberg 1992, Sinclair 1994, Wirl 1994a, 1994b, 1995, Rubio and Escriche
2001, Pizer, 2002, van der Zwaan et al. 2002) to correct for the stock externality
associated with greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Some papers have explicitly linked
the corrective taxes to the optimal exploitation of non-renewable resources (Sinclair
1992, Falk and Mendelsohn 1993, Withagen 1994, Ulph and Ulph 1994, Farzin 1996,
Farzin and Tahvonen 1996, Hoel and Kverndokk 1996, Tahvonen 1997), but no papers
have evaluated the e¤ect of non-linear decay of GHG emissions on the optimal tax.1
This de…ciency in the existing literature is important as the uptake of atmospheric
carbon is non-linear in terms of cumulative carbon emissions (Joos et al. 1996).
To address the dynamic tax problem and assess the a¤ects on non-linear decay on
the time path of corrective taxes and cumulative emissions, an optimal feedback con-
trol description is developed and some of its important features are derived. Unlike
existing approaches that mitigate climate change, our approach makes it possible to
determine an optimal corrective tax as a function of the level of cumulative emissions.
The approach developed in this paper can be applied to maximize consumer surplus,
producer surplus, or both. The application of the method to climate change is a
genuine example of adaptive regulation. In each period, when new information on
cumulative emissions is available (see also Sandal and Steinshamn, 1998), the correc-
tive tax is adjusted. This approach provides insights for setting of taxes to address the
potential problems of climate change. Sensitivity analysis suggests that the results
are economically signi…cant for climate change as di¤erent pollution decay functions
1Farzin and Tahvonen (1996), however, use a more sophisticated linear formulation than the
others.
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yield quite di¤erent time horizons, total level of extraction and levels of pollution.
As the objective function in the model rests on the basic supply and demand
functions, and as these may be general functions of the state variable, the model is
particularly suited to investigate the e¤ects of consumers’ preferences on the optimal
tax. By consumers’ preferences is, e.g., meant that the demand for a polluting product
may decrease with the aggregated level of pollution.
The article is structured as follows. The feedback model and some main properties
of the optimal policy rule are derived in section two. To show the potential importance
for climate change policy, the sensitivity of the results is assessed in terms of both
the decay function for stock pollution and the dependence of consumer demand on
cumulative emissions.
The paper concludes with an assessment of the approach and its insights in terms
of mitigating the consequences of climate change and other environmental problems
associated with a stock pollutant.
THE MODEL
The objective is to maximize accumulated welfare, de…ned by the function
W =
Z T
0
e¡±t fU(a(t); x(t)) ¡ D(a(t))g dt +
Z 1
T
e¡±t
neU (t) ¡ D(a(t))o dt, (1)
with respect to x. The variable U is the social bene…t derived from production and
consumption of the good, x. Here x represents extraction of fossil fuels, t is time
and ± is the discount rate. The social bene…t can also be a¤ected by the aggregate
level of pollution, a. In addition, we have the direct damage of a which is the stock
externality D. Further, eU is an alternative technology that can replace fossil fuels,
e.g. fuel cell technology for automobiles. There is positive extraction of the resource,
x > 0, up to time T , and zero extraction after T . Unnecessary technicalities are
avoided by assuming that we can not go back to the old technology after having
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switched to the new one. The switching time, T , is to be determined endogenously.
To determine the optimal switching time, and investigate how it is a¤ected by the
decay, is an important aim in itself. In addition we want to determine a rather simple
way to calculate the optimal corrective tax as a feedback control law. We will neglect
the possibility of having a transition period where both types of technology are in
place simultaneously. From a practical point of view this amounts to assuming that
the transition period is short compared to the initial phase.
We strongly emphasize that the scope of this paper is to study how the time horizon,
T , and the optimal feedback policy depend on the assumptions about non-separability
in the objective function and about the decay function.
The functions U and D may, in principle, be fairly general in a. Social utility U
may, e.g., represent the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surplus. The inclusion of a
in U then describes how the level of GHG a¤ects the demand and cost structure. For
example, more pollution may increase consumers’ concern for the environment and
hence cause a downward shift in the demand curve for the polluting product. This
case will be investigated later.
Denoting the remaining stock of fossil fuels s; equation (1) must be maximized
subject to the constraints2
_s = ¡x;
s(t) = s0 ¡
Z t
0
x(u)du ¸ 0; s0 = s(0) > 0; (2)
x(t) ¸ 0; lim
t!1a(t) = 0;
and
_a = x ¡ f (a) (3)
where f is the decay function and _a and x are measured in the same units. The
condition on the aggregated level of pollution, a, in (2) ensures that we only consider
2Dots denote time derivatives.
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policies that restore a clean environment in the long run and exclude policies that
produce irreversibility.
De…nition 1 (The Usual Assumptions) The following assumptions are made about
the input functions if nothing else is speci…cally stated:
1. The damage function D(a) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, non-decreasing
and convex on a …xed interval A = (0; a) (su¢ciently large) and D(0) = 0.
2. The decay function f(a) is positive and twice di¤erentiable on A, and f(0) = 0:
Moreover, lim
a!0
R ®
a
ds
f(s) ! 1 for any 0 < ® 2 A. Possible convex parts of f are
restricted by Uxf 00 · D00 on A £ B where B = (0; x). The marginal decay rate
is limited by f
0(a)+±
f (a) · D
0(a)
D(a) for some ± > 0.
3. The alternative utility function, eU (t) > 0; is continuously di¤erentiable on
(0; 1) and non-decreasing.
4. The current utility function U(a; x) is concave and twice continuously di¤eren-
tiable on A £ B. Further3, Ua · 0, Ux > 0, Uxx < 0 on A £ B.
The second item puts some constraints on possible convex parts of the decay func-
tion. It is, however, su¢cient that it holds on the optimal path. Further, f (0) = 0
means that a = 0 is de…ned as the pre-industrial level of a which is a natural steady
state. The last part of item 2 limits the relative change in natural cleaning versus the
relative change in disutility associated with the stock of pollution.
A rather general decay function is useful as the decay of CO2 through photosyn-
thesis may be a very complex process (Joos et al., 1996). Global warming may a¤ect
the growth of forests and phytoplankton, which again a¤ects the CO2 level. Increased
concentrations of GHG emissions may initially increase the assimilative capacity of
3Subscript denotes partial derivative
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the environment to uptake carbon due to carbon fertilization. Further increases in
GHG emissions, however, that lead to even higher GHG concentrations and higher
surface temperatures, may eventually lead to plant die o¤s that could ultimately re-
duce carbon uptake. The fact that there is a saturation level for how much carbon
the oceans can take, also calls for a non-monotone function. Obviously the decay
of carbon is a complex process that can not be well represented by linear, or even
monotone, functions.
The initial stock of fossil fuel, s0, is given. There exists an exogenously given
stock level below which the costs of extracting are so high that no extraction takes
place. By rescaling units this level is de…ned as zero. Hence s0 represents extractable
reserves. The level a = 0 is de…ned as the natural, pre-industrial level of CO2, which
is a natural steady state and does not harm the global climate. Thus f(0) = 0 and
D(0) = 0, and after extraction has terminated a will gradually approach zero.
By letting the bene…t function represent the sum of producers’ and consumers’
surplus it can be written
U (a; x) =
Z x
0
[P (a; y) ¡ C(a; y)] dy
where P is the inverse demand function and C is the marginal cost of extraction,
which is the market supply.
A more general formulation of the model would be to include s explicitly in U ,
but this would complicate the calculations considerably compared to the gain and
blur our focus. Therefore the simplifying assumption is made that U is independent
of s for s ¸ 0, and that extraction costs increase to in…nity (U = ¡1) for s < 0.
Remember that s has been rescaled accordingly.
At any point in time market clearing is assumed, implying that the equilibrium
level of x is given by P = C without any policy measures. In other words, C is the
market supply of x in a competitive economy. A competitive supply of fossil fuel is
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assumed throughout the paper.
In the literature it is quite common to choose objective functions that are quadratic
both in the control variable and the state variable and constraints that are linear in
both (so-called linear-quadratic models) for mathematical convenience. In the present
model both the objective function and the dynamic constraint are fairly general in
the state variable, a. In other words, it is assumed that demand can be a¤ected in
a rather general way by the level of CO2, due to changes in environmental concern
among consumers among other reasons.
The externality indicates that there is need for some policy instrument in the form
of quotas or corrective taxes. In this paper we use an ad valorem tax de…ned by
µ(a; x) =
P (a; x) ¡ C(a; x)
C(a; x)
: (4)
Here C is the producer price and P is the consumer price. Note that maximizing the
sum of the consumers’ surplus, the producers’ surplus and the government’s surplus,
which is the tax revenue, is equivalent to maximizing U ¡ D (see Appendix 1).
It is important to keep in mind that the instrument is in e¤ect only during the
initial period with extraction. As the corrective tax is on extraction, x, it is not
possible to levy any tax when t > T even though the harmful e¤ects, D(a), persist
into this period. An optimal tax in the initial period, therefore, also must take into
account the stock externality in the terminal period. It does not matter whether µ or
x is chosen as control variable in the mathematical model. The approach taken here
is that the optimal extraction level, x, is found and substituted into (4) in order to
…nd the optimal tax.
The time at which it is optimal to stop extraction, is determined by the value of
the alternative technology, eU (t). The time-dependence in eU represents technological
development, and it is therefore assumed that eU is non-decreasing.
Let H = H(t; a; s; x; m; n) denote the current value Hamiltonian and let m and
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n denote the current value costate variables associated with pollution, a, and the
remaining extractable resource, s, respectively. The necessary conditions are summa-
rized in Table 1. A scrap value formulation of the problem is developed in appendix
2. The existence of an optimal policy using the classical Filippov-Cesari existence
proof and the scrap value formulation is given in appendix 3. In this appendix it is
also shown that an Arrow-type su¢cient condition is satis…ed.
Table 1
Description Initial period Terminal period
Time 0 · t < T t > T
Production x > 0; x(T ) = xT ¸ 0 x = 0
Social welfare U(a; x) ¡ D(a) eU (t) ¡ D(a)
Dynamic constraint 1 _a = x ¡ f(a) _a = ¡f(a)
Dynamic constraint 2 _s = ¡x _s = 0
Hamiltonian H = U(a; x) ¡ D(a)+ H = eU (t) ¡ D(a)+
+ m ¢ [x ¡ f (a)] ¡ n ¢ x ¡ m ¢ f(a)
x = argmaxH, x ¸ 0 m ¡ n = ¡Ux, x > 0 m ¡ n · 0, x = 0
Costate equation 1 _m = [± + f 0(a)] ¢ m+ _m = [± + f 0(a)] ¢ m+
+ D0(a) ¡ Ua + D0(a)
Costate equation 2 _n = ±n n ¢ s = 0; n ¸ 0
The interpretations of the costate variables are that m is the shadow cost of pollu-
tion (CO2) whereas n is the scarcity rent of the resource.
In addition to this there is the requirement that the Hamiltonian and the state
and costate variables are continuous at all times including T . The state variables in
this maximization problem are a and s. As the stock of fossil fuel, s0, is limited, the
system will not settle on a non-trivial steady state.
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Matching conditions
This section concentrates on the matching that takes place at the switching time
T . By de…ning zero as the pre-industrial level of CO2; which is the natural steady
state, we have f (0) = 0. We introduce two important quantities ª and - that are
key expressions in the matching conditions at the switching time T by
ª(a;®) ´
Z ®
a
ds
f(s)
and -(a; m;®) = m ¢ f(a) + e±ª(a;®)
Z a
0
e¡±ª(s;®)D0(s)ds.
(5)
We suppress the dependence on the constant ® and use for ease of notation ª =
ª(a) and - = -(a; m).
The following proposition characterizes the shadow price on pollution in the second
phase
Proposition 1 The quantities t¡ª; e¡±t- and e¡±ª- are constants along the opti-
mal path for t > T .
Totally di¤erentiating the …rst two expressions with respect to time yields the result
directly. The constancy of the third follows from the other two. The …rst follows from
noticing that _ª = 1. The second results from:
_- = _mf + m _f + ± _ª(- ¡ mf) + e±ªD0 ¢ e¡±ª ¢ _a
= [(± + f 0)m + D0] f + mf 0 ¢ _a + ± (- ¡ mf) + D0 ¢ _a
= ±- ) d
dt
£
e¡±t-
¤
= 0.
Let us …x ® = a(T ) = aT in the de…nition of ª. We then get the following corollary
that will be useful later:
Corollary 1 Assuming that mf ! 0 when a ! 0 in the second phase (t > T ), then
the following relationships must hold:
t = T +ª(a) and - = 0 or m ¢ f (a) = ¡e±ª(a)
Z a
0
e¡±ª(s)D0(s)ds. (6)
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Proof: The …rst is an immediate consequence of the de…nition of aT . Letting a ! 0
in the expression for - yields:
- = lim
a!0
·
e±ª(a)
Z a
0
e¡±ª(s)D0(s)ds
¸
= lim
a!0
R a
0 e
¡±ª(s)D0(s)ds
e¡±ª(a)
= lim
a!0
e¡±ª(a)D0(a)
e¡±ª(a)(¡±ª0) = ±
¡1 lim
a!0f(a)D
0(a) = 0:
L’Hospital’s rule has been applied together with the fact that lim
a!0ª(a) ! 1 from the
Usual Assumptions (or t = T +ª ! 1 ) a ! 0).
Notice that in the limit of vanishing discount rate the above result implies mf+D =
0. This result must be interpreted carefully. In the case of zero discounting the
optimality notion must be modi…ed. A frequently used alternative is the notion of
Catching-Up (CU) optimality (see e.g. page 232 in Seierstad and Sydsæther, 1987).
The following lemma can now be derived:
Lemma 1 The shadow price m is negative for all times 0 · t < 1.
From the usual conditions and eq. (6) it is evident that m < 0 when T · t < 1.
Let us therefore assume that there exists a last point in time t0 < T such that m = 0.
The evolution equation for the shadow price at t = t0 implies _m = (± + f 0)m +
D0 ¡ Ua = D0 ¡ Ua > 0. This gives that m > 0 immediately after, contradicting the
fact that m < 0 to the right of t = t0. By continuity of the shadow price we have
established Lemma 1.
Even though the result stated in lemma 1 is to be expected from an economic point
of view, it serves the purpose of being a consistency check of our modelling approach.
At the core of our approach lies the problem of determining when and how the switch
will take place. The key result is given in the following proposition.
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Proposition 2 (Matching Conditions) The pollution level aT , the scarcity rent
nT and the consumption xT immediately prior to the switch at time t = T , is deter-
mined by the following set of equations
U(aT ; xT ) = xT ¢ Ux(aT ; xT ) + eU(T ) (7)
nT = mT + Ux(aT ; xT ) (8)
mT ¢ f (aT ) = ¡
Z aT
0
e¡±ª(s;aT )D0(s)ds (9)
where nT and T satisfy8<: nT = 0 and s0 >
R T
0 x(¿)d¿ =
R aT
a0
X(s)
X(s)¡f(s)ds or
nT > 0 and s0 =
R aT
a0
X(s)
X(s)¡f(s)ds
(10)
T =
Z aT
a0
1
X(s) ¡ f (s)ds (11)
The function x = X(a) represents the optimal feedback solution for the consump-
tion which, at this point, is assumed to be known. In the next section we give the
appropriate boundary value problem for the optimal feedback control law. The …ve
relations in Proposition 2 determine in principle T , aT , xT , mT and nT when X(a) is
known. Because X(a) will be known as a functional of these parameters it will lead
to a non-trivial boundary value problem (BVP). Calculating actual values for these
parameters is therefore a formidable task. This explains why much of the work in
this …eld assume some of these parameters exogenously given in such away that the
problem is reduced to a straightforward initial value problem. In the numeric section
we will calculate all parameters for some particular cases.
Proposition 2 is derived as follows. Equation (7) follows from continuity of the
Hamiltonian (see Table 1). The interpretation of this condition is that the di¤erence
in utility between the new and the old technology (U¡ eU) shall equal the consumption
at T valued by the marginal utility. At the switching time U is still greater than eU ,
but the di¤erence compensates for the future damage of the last produced units. That
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is, just prior to switching an additional polluting unit should account for the future
cost of the associated pollution. Thus it is to be expected that U ¡ eU > 0 at the
switching time t = T .
Equation (8) follows from continuity of the costates and Ux = n ¡ m. which holds
throughout the …rst phase as it follows from the condition that the production should
maximize the Hamiltonian. The interpretation is simply that the marginal bene…ts
and costs must balance each other.
Equation (9) follows directly from Equation(6). The relations (10) follow from
the transversality condition on nT and the boundary conditions on s. Equation (11)
follows from _a = X(a) ¡ f (a).
The proposition also follows from standard transversality conditions for an associ-
ated …nite horizon problem with a salvage value. This is shown in appendix 2.
Concavity of the maximized Hamiltonian
The Hamiltonian in the …rst phase, 0 · t · T , is also the Hamiltonian for the
alternative formulation with scrap value. Both formulations yield the same necessary
conditions. Assume at this point that the solution to the necessary conditions has
been found. It will be demonstrated that such a solution is optimal as it satis…es an
Arrow-type su¢ciency theorem. In order to do so, we must show that the maximized
Hamiltonian is concave in the state space under consideration. Other details are given
in appendix 3. The current value Hamiltonian is given in Table 1. There is an interior
unique solution to Hx = 0 as Ux > 0:
Hx = Ux(a; x) + m ¡ n = 0 ) x = X(a; m ¡ n) and Xa = ¡UaxUxx : (12)
The maximized Hamiltonian is given by
H0(a; m; n) = H(a;X(a; m ¡ n); m; n):
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Di¤erentiating with respect to a and using (12):
H0a = Ha(a;X; m;n) + Hx(a; X; m;n)Xa(a; m ¡ n) = Ha(a; X; m; n)
H0aa = Haa(a; X; m; n) + Hax(a; X;m; n)Xa
= Uaa(a; X) ¡ D00(a) ¡ mf 00(a) + Uax(a; X)Xa;
or in more suitable form:
H0aa =
UaaUxx ¡ U2ax
Uxx
+ [¡D00 ¡ mf 00] :
It is now straightforward to prove that
H0aa · UaaUxx ¡ U
2
ax
Uxx
(13)
by using the fact that m < 0. This is seen by the following reasoning:
1) In any region where f 00 < 0 it is trivially true as both terms in the square
brackets are negative since D00 > 0 by the Usual Assumptions.
2) In the rest of the state space therefore 0 · ¡mf 00 = (Ux ¡ n)f 00 · Uxf 00 · D00
or ¡mf 00 ¡ D00 · 0. The optimal condition m ¡ n = ¡Ux from (12) has been used
in the equality, and the non-negativity of the scarcity rent has been used in the next
inequality. The last inequality stems from Usual Assumption 2 that restricts the
strength of the convexity of f .
The right-hand side of (13) is non-positive due to the convexity of U .
The optimal path
In order to study the optimal path of the control variable x; and the corresponding
tax, it is useful to derive the optimal control as a function of the state variable; that
is, as a feedback control law. A feedback control law represents an adaptive regulation
as the optimal tax is directly a¤ected by changes in the environment. The tax level
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is determined as soon as the level of pollution is estimated. Time, as such, is of no
relevance.
The di¤erential equation governing the optimal feedback rule for the control vari-
able, x, is readily derived. Both from a mathematical and economic perspective it is
useful to de…ne the following scalar functions:
S(a) ´ U (a; f (a)) ¡ D(a),
L(a; x) ´ U(a; x) ¡ Ux(a; x) ¢ (x ¡ f(a)) ¡ U(a; f (a)).
P(a; x) ´ L(a; x) + S(a)
(14)
The economic interpretation of S is that it represents the level of social bene…t that
can be obtained at any time by …xing the level of CO2 by producing x = f such
that _a = 0. L(a; x) holds a potential utility gain much the same way that a moving
physical object holds a potential of doing work (its energy content) strictly associated
with its movement. Its value is associated with the change in the pollution-level and,
as such, can be viewed as a dynamic potential utility gain for changing the pollution
state in the total asset.
Lemma 2 L(a; x) is positive semi-de…nite and it is zero on the curve x = f(a).
The semi-de…nite property is a direct result of The Usual Assumptions, in particular
the regularity and the concavity of U with respect to x.
Lemma 3 P is equal in value (but not as a function) with the quantity H+ nf; and
it satis…es the relation _P = [nf 0 ¡ ±Ux] _a on any part of an optimal path in the …rst
phase.
The …rst result follows from noticing that H + nf = U(a; x) ¡ D(a) + (m ¡ n) ¢
[x ¡ f (a)]. Inserting the …rst order condition for m ¡ n from Table 1 results in
H + nf = U (a; x) ¡ D(a) ¡ Ux ¢ [x ¡ f(a)] = L + S. The last part follows from
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di¤erentiating the above result and applying the …rst order conditions:
_P = _H + _nf + n _f = Ha _a + Hx _x+ Hm _m+ Hn _n + _nf + n _f
= HaHm + Hm (±m ¡ Ha) + Hn±n + ±nf + nf 0 _a
= Hm±m ¡ (x ¡ f)±n + nf 0 _a = ± (m ¡ n) _a + nf 0 _a = [¡±Ux + nf 0] _a.
The quantity P can be interpreted as the total rent less the resource rent. This lemma
gives us an important tool for producing the optimal feedback policy.
The problem initiated in this paper can now be stated as the following boundary
value problem:
Proposition 3 (Boundary value problem) The …rst order condition for the con-
trol problem de…ned through equations (1, 2 & 3) implies the boundary value problem
given by 26664
1 0 0
0 ¡Uxx 0
0 0 1
37775
26664
_a
_x
_n
37775 =
26664
x ¡ f
¡Pa ¡ ±Ux + nf 0
±n
37775 , (15)
and the boundary conditions are given by the relations stated in the Matching Condi-
tions together with the initial condition on a.
We only need to show the di¤erential equation for the production, x. The other
two are already given in table . Di¤erentiating the equation stating that we have
an inner optimum for t < T , and using the other …rst order conditions (see table ),
implies
d
dt
Ux =
d
dt
(n ¡ m) = _n ¡ _m = ±n ¡ [(± + f 0)m ¡ Ua + D0] = ±(n ¡ m) ¡ f 0m+
+Ua ¡ D0 = (± + f 0) (n ¡ m) ¡ nf 0 ¡ Ua + D0 = (± + f 0)Ux + Ua ¡ D0 ¡ nf 0
= ±Ux ¡ nf 0 ¡ D0 + Ua + f 0Ux = ±Ux ¡ nf 0 + [Pa + (x ¡ f)Uxa] .
Finally inserting ddtUx = Uxx _x+Uxa _a = Uxx _x+Uxa(x¡f) completes the derivation.
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Notice that Lemma 3 yields
_P = Pa _a + Px _x = Pa _a + Lx _x = [¡±Ux + nf 0] _a , Lx _x = [¡Pa ¡ ±Ux + nf 0] _a
Further notice that Lx = ¡(x ¡ f )Uxx = ¡Uxx _a. By dividing by _a, we get the
result provided _a 6= 0. Alternatively, we can view the last derivation as a direct way
to obtain the optimal feedback BVP problem as
¡(x ¡ f)Uxx dxda = ¡Pa ¡ ±Ux + nf
0 and (x ¡ f )dn
da
= ±n.
together with the Matching Conditions.
The next proposition supply bounds on the optimal policy or the rate of change
in pollution. This proposition covers the typical case where the level of pollution is
non-decreasing in the period with the old polluting technology.
Proposition 4 (Lower bound on P) The optimal feedback policy x = X(a) satis-
…es in the limit ± ! 0 the following relation:
M(a) [x ¡ f (a)]2 + S(a) ¸ P (a; x) = L (a; x) + S(a) = eU(T ) + nf(a). (16)
In the typical cases where X(a) ¸ f(a) and ± > 0 for t · T the optimal policy implies
a lower bound on _a = x ¡ f (a) given by
M(a) ¢ _a2 + S(a) ¸ P (a; x) ¸ eU(T ) ¡ ~D(aT ) + nf (a) + ±´(a; aT ); (17)
where M(a) = max
x=[0;x]
jUxx(a; x)j, ~D(z) = D(z)¡R z0 e¡±ª(a;z)D0(a)da ¸ 0 and ´(a; aT ) =R aT
a Ux(z; x)dz ¸ 0 .
The properties of U imply
L (a; x) = U(x; a) ¡ U(f; a) ¡ Ux(x; a) ¢ (x ¡ f) · (x ¡ f ) ¢ Ux(f; a) ¡ (x ¡ f ) ¢ Ux(x; a)
= (x ¡ f ) ¢ [Ux(f; a) ¡ Ux(x; a)] = (x ¡ f) ¢ Uxx(µ; a) ¢ (f ¡ x) · M(a) ¢ (x ¡ f )2:
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A utility function of the form U (a; x) = ¯(a)x ¡ °(a)x2 results in the equality
P (a; x) = M(a) [x ¡ f (a)]2 + S(a).
Lemma 3 yields
P (a; x) = P (aT ; xT ) +
Z t
T
n _f dt ¡ ±
Z t
T
Ux _adt
= P (aT ; xT ) + [nf ]tT ¡ ±
·Z t
T
nf dt +
Z t
T
Ux _adt
¸
= ~U (T ) ¡ ~D(aT ) + nf(a) ¡ ±
·Z t
T
nf dt +
Z t
T
Ux _adt
¸
= ~U (T ) ¡ ~D(aT ) + nf(a) + ±
·Z T
t
nf dt +
Z T
t
Ux _adt
¸
¸ ~U (T ) ¡ ~D(aT ) + nf(a) + ±
Z T
t
Ux _adt :
We used the matching condition U(aT ; xT )¡xT Ux(aT ; xT ) = ~U(T ) in the second line
above. The limit ± ! 0 imposes ~D(z) ! 0 and the second line above implies relation
(16). The third line yields P (a; x) ¸ ~U(T )¡ ~D(aT )+nf(a)+ ± R aTa Ux(a; X(a))da ¸
~U(T ) ¡ ~D(aT ) + nf(a) + ±´(a; aT ) when _a ¸ 0.
The proposition assert that X(a) = f (a) §
r³eU(T ) + nf (a) ¡ S(a)´ =M(a) is a
very good approximation for an optimal policy if the discount rate is close to zero. It
represents an explicit feedback expression in the case of a constant alternative utility
with some of the non-renewable resource left unextracted (n = 0).
NUMERICAL EXAMPLES.
The boundary value problem determining the feedback rule described in the pre-
vious sections can be used to obtain the optimal extraction path both as a function
of the aggregate level of CO2 and as a pure function of time. The former seems,
however, to be more useful from a regulators point of view as the tax is adaptive to
the current CO2-level, and no forecasting is required.
In this section the model is illustrated by a couple of numerical examples using
18
quasi-realistic data. A quadratic damage function (stock externality) is assumed, and
the e¤ects of two di¤erent decay functions are investigated.
Numerical speci…cation and results
The aggregate level as well as emissions of CO2 are measured in giga-tons CO2 (Gt-
CO2). One Gt-CO2 corresponds to 7.81 parts per million (p.p.m., which is another
common measure of carbon). The meteorological data are given in Table 2. The
pre-industrial level, which is a natural steady state without extraction, is estimated
to 2187 and the current level is 2812. Rescaling such that the pre-industrial level, by
de…nition, is zero yields the present level a(0) = a0 = 625:
Table 2. Meteorological data (Gt-CO2)
Parameter Value Parameter Value
f(a0) 11.7 a0 625
x0 21.9 s0 7000
The data in Table 2 have been provided by the Nansen Environmental and Remote
Sensing Centre in Bergen, Norway. Also the stock of fossil fuels, s, are measured in
the same units. The economic data given in Table 3 are based on short-term supply-
and demand elasticities for fossil fuel equal to 2 and -0.15, respectively, when a = a0
(Burniaux et al., 1992). As the model is adaptive, it is the short-term elasticities that
are relevant. The inverse demand for fossil fuel is assumed to be linear:
P (x) = p0 ¡ p1 ¢ x
where p0 and p1 are parameters. The marginal cost function is also assumed to be
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linear:
C(x) = c0 + c1 ¢ x;
implying that U is quadratic. All parameters in the demand and supply function can
be made dependent on the state variable, a; if that is relevant. The next subsection
looks at an example where the parameter p0 has been made a-dependent in order to
represent the consumers’ concern for the environment.
The values of the economic parameters in this section are given in Table 3.
Table 3. Economic data (normalized)
Parameter Value Parameter Value
p0 15.3 p1 0.64
c0 1 c1 0.05
D(a) 9¢10¡5 ¢ a2 eU(t) 101 + 0:01 ¢ t
It is seen from Table 3 that the marginal cost of extraction at zero production has
been normalized to one. Further, a price 15.3 times higher than this is assumed to
choke all demand, and the market equilibrium level with these parameter values is
equal to current emissions.
The stock externality is quadratic in a. The size of the externality is uncertain, but
most studies indicate that it will be around two percent of the world’s gross domestic
product if current emissions continue (Schelling, 1997).
Two decay-functions have been used, namely the linear one f(a) = 11:7625 a; and the
nonlinear
f (a) =
³
5 + 958 ¢ e¡1¢10¡6a2
´
a
a + 34300
:
They yield quite di¤erent results as seen from Table 4.
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Table 4. Key results
Linear decay Non-linear decay
x(0) 16.3 14.0
x(T ) 19.1 14.6
a(T ) 824 683
T 59.5 23.8
µ(0) 169% 273%
µ(T ) 72% 245%
The panel in Figure 1 shows pollution, optimal production and the corresponding tax
as functions of time. In addition, the corrective tax is also illustrated as a function
of the pollution level, that is the feedback relationship. Notice that with linear decay
the optimal tax is …rst slightly increasing and then decreasing.
The panel in Figure 2 shows the same relationships but with non-linear decay. In
this case the optimal tax is strictly decreasing. The values of the key variables with
linear and non-linear decay are listed in Table 4. It is seen from the table that with
non-linear decay optimal production is lower and, hence, the corresponding tax is
higher. The reason for this is that linear decay represents a too optimistic view on
how much pollution nature itself can handle. The cleaning capability increases with
pollution for all pollution levels. With a more realistic decay function it is realized
that a more active policy is needed. Also the period with production is lower with
non-linear decay. Total extraction therefore is smaller with non-linear decay. We note
that the more conservative policy, that is the one with non-linear decay, is more stable
with respect to the policy instrument. This is an advantage from the policy-makers
point of view.
These examples are not meant to give a precise description of reality but to em-
phasize the importance of studying non-linear decay and that analyses based solely
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on linear decay functions are not su¢cient. It emphasizes the need for both more
empirical and theoretical studies on the decay function.
Consumer preferences
One of the advantages with the model presented in this paper is that the objective
function is non-separable in a and x. This makes it possible to analyze the sensitivity
of the results to, e.g., consumers’ concern for the environment. Let us assume that
the behavior of the consumers is such that the more pollution there is, the more the
demand curve for the polluting product will shift downwards. This may be achieved
by letting the parameter p0 be a function of a instead of a constant. In this subsection
it is shown that the optimal time period with extraction is quite sensitive to this
assumption, and therefore this is an important property of the model.
The speci…cation applied here represents a rather weak a-dependence of p0:
p0(a) = 16 ¡ 0:00112 ¢ a:
At a = a0 = 625 we have p0 = 15:3; the same as earlier. Further, at a = 1250 we
have p0 = 14:6. In other words, increasing a by 22 % implies that the intercept of the
linear demand curve is reduced by 5 % (remember that 625 is the rescaled value of a).
Nevertheless, as can be seen from Table 5, such an a-dependence results in reduction
of the optimal period of extraction from 23.8 to 21.7 with nonlinear decay and from
22
59.5 years to 42.1 with linear decay. Table 5 can be directly compared to Table 4.
Table 5. Key results when p0 is a-dependent
Linear decay Non-linear decay
x(0) 15.8 13.6
x(T ) 16.9 14.3
a(T ) 754 671
T 42.1 21.7
µ(0) 189% 292%
µ(T ) 134% 253%
By comparing Table 4 with Table 5 it is seen that both optimal production and the
period with production are lower with consumer awareness. However, the relative
change is smaller with non-linear decay than with linear decay. The reason for this is
probably that with non-linear decay the optimal policy is already quite restrictive, and
therefore the additional e¤ect of consumer awareness is not that signi…cant. Figures
3 and 4 correspond to …gures 1 and 2, but now with a-dependence in the demand
function.
Again this example is not meant to describe the reality but to emphasize the impor-
tance of including endogenous consumer behavior and also to stress the importance
of more empirical research on these aspects. The bottom line in this section is that
consumers’ concern for the environment may partly compensate the decision makers
failure to estimate the correct decay function, as long as the policy is adaptive and
consumers’ preferences are elaborated.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper a feedback control law that can be used to control the production
of fossil fuel products in the presence of stock externalities associated with emissions
of greenhouse gases has been used to analyze the e¤ects of non-linear decay and
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consumer awareness upon optimal carbon taxes. The main result is that the tax is
quite sensitive to both these phenomena.
The total time horizon in the optimization problem is divided into two periods, one
with extraction and emissions and one without extraction. The model has been used
to analyze the time path of the corrective tax in the period with extraction by taking
into account the stock externality both in this period and in the remaining period.
Special emphasis has been put on the e¤ects of non-monotone decay of carbon in
the atmosphere and the interaction with consumer preferences. If decay is, in fact,
monotone the optimal period of extraction will be much longer than if it is non-
monotone. This result, however, may again be a¤ected if consumers have a strong
concern for the environment such that the demand for a polluting product decreases
with the level of pollution. In this case the period of extraction will be much shorter.
The sensitivity to the shape of the decay function also stresses the importance of
estimating the decay function. Assuming a linear decay function for mathematical
convenience, as is often done, may represent a serious mistake if the actual decay is
non-monotone.
Using current data on cumulative emissions, and starting from the same initial
values, the time paths of the corrective taxes with non-linear and linear decay of the
pollution stock are shown to be very di¤erent. Under non-linear decay, the optimal
extraction period of the non-renewable resource is about 24 years while with linear
decay the extraction period is almost 60 years.
The results in this paper con…rms the results by Ulph and Ulph (1994) that the time
path of the optimal path depends on the decay function, and that papers claiming
that the tax should decline over time, e.g. Sinclair (1992), are not correct in general.
However, as Ulph and Ulph look at linear decay, they conclude that positive decay
makes the tax rise over time. In this paper it is shown that the optimal tax can
increase or decrease over time depending on the shape of the decay function. The
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numerical results are somewhat di¤erent from what Ulph and Ulph found, especially
as they assume an exogenous switching time.
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APPENDIX 1. THE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION
In this appendix it is shown that the sum of consumers’ surplus, producers’ surplus
and the government’s surplus is equal to U ¡D. If these surpluses are called CS, PS
and GS, respectively, we have by de…nition
CS ´
Z x
0
P (a; s) ds ¡ (C(a; x) + ¿ )x;
PS ´ C(a; x)x ¡
Z x
0
C(a; s) ds;
GS ´ ¿x ¡ D(a):
Summing these surpluses yieldsZ x
0
[P (a; s) ¡ C(a; s)] ds ¡ D(a):
APPENDIX 2. A SCRAP VALUE FORMULATION
The purpose of this appendix is to show how the matching conditions (7) to (11)
are derived using a salvage (or scrap) value approach. The present value of the last
phase of the in…nite time problem can alternatively be de…ned as the salvage value
for a problem with a …nite time horizon T where T is to be determined as part of the
optimization.
In (5) the function ª(a;®) was de…ned. By setting ® = aT ; and applying Proposi-
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tion 2, it is readily seen that
t = T +ª = T +ª(a; aT ) where
@ª
@a
= ¡ 1
f (a)
and
@ª
@aT
=
1
f (aT )
:
Calling the present value of the last period '; it can be de…ned and written as:
'(T; aT ) =
Z 1
T
e¡±t
heU(t) ¡ D(a)i dt = Z 1
T
e¡±t eU(t)dt + Z aT
0
e¡±(T+ª)
D(a)
f(a)
da:
Partial integration of the last term yields
'(T; aT ) =
Z 1
T
e¡±t eU(t)dt ¡ e¡±T
±
·
D(aT ) ¡
Z aT
0
e¡±ªD0(a)da
¸
:
The transversality conditions involve @'@T and
@'
@aT
. Straightforward calculations yield
@'
@T
= ¡e¡±T
·eU (T ) ¡ D(aT ) + Z aT
0
e¡±ªD0(a)da
¸
@'
@aT
= ¡ e
¡±T
f (aT )
Z aT
0
e¡±ªD0(a)da: (18)
Notice that _'(T; aT ) = ¡e¡±T
heU(T ) ¡ D(aT )i from its de…nition. The Hamiltonian
in this case is given by:
H(t; a; s; x; m; n) = e¡±t [U(a; x) ¡ D(a)] + m ¢ (x ¡ f (a)) ¡ n ¢ x:
The transversality condition on the shadow price of pollution is mT = @'@aT or
e±TmT f(aT ) = ¡
Z aT
0
e¡±ªD0(a)da; (19)
which is recognized as matching condition (9). The transversality condition associated
with a free time horizon is H + @'@T = 0 at t = T . Before we apply this relationship,
we use the fact that the optimal policy is, by de…nition, an interior solution which
implies:
m ¡ n = ¡e¡±tUx(a; x): (20)
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Inserted into the Hamiltonian this yields H = e¡±t [U ¡ D ¡ xUx]¡m ¢f . At the end
of the …rst period, t = T , we get from (19):
H +
@'
@T
= e¡±T
·
U ¡ D ¡ xUx +
Z aT
0
e¡±ªD0(a)da
¸
¡ e¡±T
·eU ¡ D + Z aT
0
e¡±ªD0(a)da
¸
= e¡±T
h
U ¡ xUx ¡ eUi :
The transversality condition on the Hamiltonian therefore implies that
U(aT ; xT ) ¡ xT Ux(aT ; xT ) ¡ eU(T ) = 0;
which is matching condition (7) in the main text.
Continuity of the shadow values at the end point t = T applied to (20) yields
matching condition (8). Condition (10) is a direct consequence of the transversality
condition on the costate variable n, and condition (11) follows directly from the
dynamic equation for the pollution level (3).
APPENDIX 3. AN EXISTENCE PROOF AND AN ARROW-TYPE
SUFFICIENCY RESULT.
In this section we show that our problem has a solution. We apply the Filippov-
Cesari existence theorem as it is given in theorem 6.18 in Seierstad and Sydsæther,
1987. The time interval of interest is taken to be [0; bT ] for su¢ciently large bT . All
the conditions in the theorem is trivially satis…ed except, possibly, for the convexity
of the set N(a; t; x) and the assumed upper constant bound on the state variables.
The latter is straightforward as can be seen from the fact that _a+ _s = ¡f(a) implies
0 · a + s · a0 + s0. The theorem assumes that the set
N(a; t; x) = f(e¡±t[U(a; x) ¡ D(a)] + °; x ¡ f (a); ¡x) : ° · 0; x 2 [0; x^]g
is convex for all (a; t) 2 R£ [0; bT ]. We …x (a; t) and let yi = e¡±t[U(a; xi)¡D(a)]+°i
and °i · 0 for i = 1; 2 and let x3 and y3 be the convex combinations of x1; x2 and y1; y2.
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From the concavity of U we have that the convex combination ¸(y1; x1¡f(a); ¡x1)+
(1 ¡ ¸)(y2; x2 ¡ f(a); ¡x2) = (¸y1 + (1 ¡ ¸)y2; x3 ¡ f(a);¡x3) = (y3; x3 ¡ f(a); ¡x3)
and y3 = e¡±t[¸U (a; x1)+ (1¡¸)U(a; x)¡D(a)] + ¸°1+ (1¡¸)°2 · e¡±t[U(a; x3)¡
D(a)] + ¸°1 + (1 ¡ ¸)°2 implying that °3 · ¸°1 + (1 ¡ ¸)°2 · 0 and thereby
(y3; x3 ¡ f(a);¡x3) 2 N (a; t; x). Hence the set is convex.
The Arrow-type su¢ciency result is based on note 6.20 in Seierstad and Sydsæther,
1987. This note deals with a more general problem than the present one. In addition
to the concavity of the maximized Hamiltonian, we need to show that the scrap
value is concave with respect to the state variables. All other conditions are trivially
satis…ed. The model presented in this paper has a simpler structure than the setting
in the referenced note. We deal with simple state constraints in the form of non-
negativity conditions and no combined constraints on state and policy.
The concavity of the scrap value '(T; aT ) is shown by di¤erentiating (18). We
obtain
@2
@a2T
'(T; aT ) = e¡±T
·
f 0(aT ) + ±
f(aT )2
Z aT
0
e¡±ª(a;aT )D0(a)da ¡ D
0(aT )
f(aT )
¸
=
e¡±T
f (aT )
Z aT
0
e¡±ª(a;aT )D0(a)da ¢
·
f 0(aT ) + ±
f(aT )
¡ D
0(aT )
D(aT )
¸
· 0:
The last term in the last square brackets stems from noticing that
R aT
0 e
¡±ª(a;aT )D0(a)da ·
D(aT ) and the inequality is a direct consequence of the constraining relation on the
marginal decay function in The Usual Assumptions.
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